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INTRODUCTION
In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed a nationwide injunction that prohibited the planting of Mon-
santo's genetically modified (GM) Roundup Ready Alfalfa.' The
Court reaffirmed its holding from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. that obtaining per-
manent injunctive relief requires surmounting a four-factor test, mak-
ing injunctive relief harder to obtain. 2 But the Court left in place the
district court's order vacating the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
(USDA's) deregulation of the GM alfalfa seed.3 Environmental
groups claimed victory because the district court's vacation order re-
turned the seed to its regulated state, effectively prohibiting planting.4
Geertson was a watershed case-the first Supreme Court opinion to
consider the potential impacts of agricultural biotechnology. 5
Geertson, Winter, and eBay have changed the landscape of reme-
dies. 6 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when a court
finds that an agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously, it typically
I See 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761-62 (2010).
2 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22-24 (2008); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (enunciating the four-factor test in the
context of permanent injunctive relief); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166,
1172-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Winter and Geertson and denying injunctive relief); see also
Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunc-
tions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing courts' application of the four-
factor test and the resulting controversy).
3 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2756 ("Because petitioners and the Government do not
argue otherwise, we assume without deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacat-
ing the deregulation decision.").
4 See Victor Li, Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms: Supreme Court Rules, Everyone Says
They Won, CORP. COUNS. (July 1, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCCjsp?id=
1202463170985.
5 See Thomas P. Redick, Biotech Liability's Watershed Year, 42 TRENDS: A.B.A. SEC.
ENV'T, ENERGY & RESOURCES NEWSL. 1, 14 (2010) (discussing Geertson's likely economic and
legal impact on agricultural biotechnology). Agricultural biotechnology refers to the tech-
nique of genetically engineering food in various forms (e.g., seeds, enzymes, animals) to
impart new characteristics or to enhance existing traits. See generally PEW INITIATIVE ON
FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FUNCTIONAL FOODS 7-9
(2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foodand-
Biotechnology/PIFBFunctionalFoods.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT].
6 See Gergen et al., supra note 2.
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vacates the action and remands to the agency to cure the defect.7 In
addition to vacation, a party also frequently seeks an injunction, re-
quiring the agency or regulated entity to perform or not to perform
some action.8 Injunctive relief allows courts greater flexibility to tailor
the relief.9 By raising the bar for this more targeted remedy, the Geert-
son Court has incentivized parties, and thus courts, to focus more
squarely on vacation for allegedly improper agency action, particularly
in environmental cases. 10
To mitigate the regulatory gap that often ensues upon vacating
an agency rule, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals began applying a
two-part test to determine whether the consequences of vacation were
so disruptive or the flaw in the agency action was so minimal that the
action should remain in place on remand.1' If so, the court would
remand without vacation (RWV).12 Facing a potential rise in vacation
requests fueled by the heightened standard for injunctive relief,
courts may respond by employing the legally questionable but increas-
ingly utilized judicial remedy of RWV.
RWV has spread to other federal courts of appeals but remains
controversial,13 and the Supreme Court has not addressed its legal-
ity. 14 Proponents of RWV point to the judiciary's historical discretion
in crafting equitable remedies. 15 They laud RWV's ability to leave
agency action in place-purportedly aiding regulated entities, benefi-
ciaries, and the agency-while allowing the agency to fix procedural
7 See Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
8 See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989)
(seeking to enjoin a timber sale by the U.S. Forest Service).
9 See 1 IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942
(2d ed. 1995).
10 Cf DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:7 4-16 n.2 (2d ed. 2010)
("An injunction is ... often the main remedy sought in environmental cases .... ").
11 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (ruling that the decision whether to vacate an inadequately supported
rule depends on "the seriousness of the order's deficiencies... and the disruptive conse-
quences of an interim change that may itself be changed" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
12 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (remanding the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) revision of national
ambient air-quality standards for particulate matter without vacating the EPA's determina-
tion); North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (remand-
ing aspects of the Clean Air Interstate Rule to the EPA without vacating the rule).
13 See Comiti de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis, No. 09-240, 2010 WL
3431761, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F.
Supp. 2d 948, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has found RWV war-
ranted when serious irreparable environmental injury is present).
14 Comiti de Apoyo, 2010 WL 3431761, at *24.
15 See Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in
Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 323-25 (2003); infta Part I.C.2.
20121
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defects or flaws in the reasoning underlying the rule.16 Opponents
attack the device on both statutory and functional grounds. They ar-
gue that it violates the APA's directive and that it disincentivizes an
agency from taking a "hard look" at its rulemaking in the first instance
and on remand.17
This Note argues that, whether or not RWV is lawful, the device is
an improper remedy for invalidated environmental deregulation. In-
deed, the reasons courts give for using RWV in cases of defective envi-
ronmental regulation demonstrate precisely why courts should not
use RWV in cases involving defective environmental deregulation.' 8
Part I briefly describes how courts review agency action under the
APA. It then summarizes the development and present use of RWV,
detailing the leading arguments for and against the device. Part II
explores Geertson and how it has set the stage for increased focus on
vacation requests. Part III analyzes the impact of Geertson on the inci-
dence of vacation requests and how the changed landscape may tempt
courts to import RWV into the deregulatory context. Part IV exam-
ines recent agricultural biotechnology cases to demonstrate why
courts should not extend RWV to invalidated environmental deregula-
tion. This Part concludes that if courts nonetheless employ the D.C.
Circuit's two-part test, they should still vacate the invalid environmen-
tal deregulation, as one court already has.' 9
I
THE HISTORY OF REMAND WITHOUT VACATION
This Part discusses the development of RWV in the D.C. Circuit.
After briefly explaining the standard for whether agency action is de-
fective, it sets forth the framework of RWV.
A. Evolution of "Hard Look" Review
Before vacating an agency action, a court must find some defi-
ciency requiring a remedy. The APA mandates that a court
"shall . . .set aside agency action [that is] arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."20 To
"set aside agency action" means to vacate the action, which could be,
16 See, e.g., Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 252 F.3d 34,
47-48 (1st Cir. 2001) (remanding without vacating and allowing the agency to correct its
reasoning).
17 See infra Part I.D.1-2.
18 See infra Part V.A.
19 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
20 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). The focus below is on the "shall ... set aside" remedial
language. See infra Part I.D.2. Here, the Note considers "arbitrary [and] capricious" as the
ground for remediation.
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for example, a regulation, a permit, or a decision to deregulate.2 1
The Supreme Court has explained that the arbitrary and capricious
standard requires a "searching and careful" review but that the "court
is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."22
These somewhat conflicting marching orders have placed lower
courts in a difficult position when reviewing agency action. 23
Because agencies have the expertise to tailor rules for often tech-
nical problems, courts recognize the importance of allowing agencies
flexibility. 24 But since regulations frequently have far-reaching effects,
courts understand the need to ensure that the agency arrived at its
conclusions in a reasoned way and followed proper procedure. 25
"Hard look" review attempts to strike this balance. 26
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the Court held that to survive review, an agency must
not only devise a rule that could achieve the desired result but also
adequately explain how it made the decision. 27 State Farm, which con-
cerned the rescission of the passive-restraint requirement in automo-
bile safety standards, was a politically charged and policy-laden
deregulatory case.28 It illustrates that the Court intended greater scru-
tiny for deregulation as compared with regulation, particularly in light
21 See infra Part I.D.2.
22 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
23 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vaca-
tur in Administrative Law, 36 ARiz. ST. LJ. 599, 610 (2004) ("The fundamental challenge for
the courts is to maintain the ability of political officials in the legislative and executive
branches to appropriately supervise agency policymaking, while making sure that the con-
stitutional rules are followed."); cf Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary
and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 16 (2009) (discussing the difficulty of judicial
review).
24 See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) ("Because
analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of technical expertise, we must
defer to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
25 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983).
26 See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (1970) (explaining
hard-look review). Although this Part focuses on hard-look review in the context of agency
action that is arbitrary and capricious, hard look also applies to the other circumstances
listed in section 706(2). See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). Under any of these circumstances,
vacation is the typical remedy, though courts may use RWV. See infra Part I.B.
27 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57; see also Checkosky v. SEC (In re Checkosky), 23 F.3d
452, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("It is firmly settled that if a court must 'guess as to
what the [agency's] decisional criteria are or should be,' the agency's order is arbitrary and
capricious." (alteration in original) (quoting Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685, 695
(D.C. Cir. 1985))); cf 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 8:31
(3d ed. 2010) ("Remand is the proper remedy where the court doubts that the agency has
properly exercised its discretion but recognizes that it is the agency which should exercise
that discretion and not the court.").
28 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of the potential for agency inertia.29 The case led to a "significant
expansion of judicial intervention in the administrative process."30
B. Development of Remand Without Vacation
As arbitrary and capricious review became more robust, courts
more frequently vacated agency regulations.3 1 Historically, reviewing
courts would vacate and remand agency rules found to be arbitrary
and capricious because of "the agency's failure to ... engage in rea-
soned decisionmaking. '32 In the 1970s and 1980s, a limited number
of courts (without citing the APA's arbitrary and capricious provision,
5 U.S.C § 706(2)) began remanding cases without vacating, primarily
when vacation would lead to an unusually severe regulatory gap. 33 For
example, in Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) had promulgated a rule concerning air-quality
standards that the Ninth Circuit held invalid.3 4 Reasoning that an im-
perfect rule addressing air pollution was preferable to no rule at all,
the court left the defective regulation in place.35
In Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C.
Circuit, after finding a rule invalid, enunciated a two-part test for de-
termining whether to use RWV: "The decision whether to vacate de-
pends on [1] 'the seriousness of the order's deficiencies . . .and [2]
the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
changed." 36 Courts may use RWV if the violation is an inadequate
procedure (such as not allowing proper notice and comment)3 7 or an
inadequate explanation of a rule, order, or action.38 As of this writ-
29 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REv. 505, 573
(1985); Gregory Bradshaw Foote, Note, Judicial Review of Rescission of Rules: A "Passive Re-
straint" on Deregulation, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 252, 254 (1985) (discussing how the Court
uses greater scrutiny for deregulatory agency actions).
30 Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 603.
31 See id.
32 RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
75 (1995).
33 See, e.g., Md. People's Counsel v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 768 F.2d 450,
455 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701,
703-04 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur:
A New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 290 n.57, 291 &
nn.59-60 (2005) (listing cases in which the D.C. Circuit remanded without vacating prima-
rily because of "defects in an agency's substantive explanation for its policy
choice . . . but .. .also .. . [for] procedural defects in an agency's rulemaking").
34 See 633 F.2d 803, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1980).
35 See id.
36 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The D.C. Circuit was the main archi-
tect of RWV. See id. at 150-51.
37 See Western Oil, 633 F.2d at 812-13.
38 See Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(per curiam) ("Although EPA's failure to set forth its rationale requires us to remand ....
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ing, the Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the First Circuit, the
Fifth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have adopted RWV.39 Although
the Third Circuit has addressed RWV, it has not formally adopted it.40
The Allied-Signal test is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. 4 1 Vacat-
ing the rule may impact the following parties: regulated entities, bene-
ficiaries, and the agency.42 If the potential "disruptive consequences"
of vacating the rule or action at issue outweigh the "seriousness of
the . . . deficiencies" of the flawed agency action, then RWV is the
likely remedy.43 Put differently, if the benefits to the aforementioned
parties outweigh the costs of keeping the flawed rule in place, then a
court may remand without vacating.44 Courts tend not to focus on
how the agency is likely to respond to the remedy.45 Environmental
cases are a subset in which the costs to beneficiaries can be high and
courts have frequently deemed RWV the appropriate remedy.
46
that defect does not require us to vacate the rule." (citation omitted)); cf. Daugirdas, supra
note 33, at 283 (explaining that courts will not apply RWV where the agency's rule violates
its organic statute).
39 E.g., Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d
1365, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
252 F.3d 34, 48 (1st Cir. 2001); Cent. & Sw. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir.
2000); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995).
40 See Council Tree Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 257-59 (3d Cir. 2010) (find-
ing that, even if applied, RWV would not be appropriate under the Allied-Signal test). But
cf Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrfcolas v. Solis, Civil Action No. 09-240, 2010 WL
3431761, at *24-25 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (applying the Allied-Signal test and remanding
without vacating).
41 See Daugirdas, supra note 33, at 291-93 (noting that RWV considers whether the
"costs of vacatur would significantly exceed the benefits in terms of improving the quality
of agency decisionmaking").
42 See id. at 285.
43 See, e.g., Davis Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (balancing interests according to the two-part test and concluding that "the more
equitable and appropriate course for this court to take is to retain the... emission guide-
lines.., on remand" because "vacating the guidelines [would] result in an eighteen month
period in which greater . . . emissions [would] occur than would occur [if the court] re-
mand[ed] for further rulemaking without vacating"). A court might also use RWV if vacat-
ing a rule would have little to no effect. See, e.g., Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v.
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 91, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (using RWV where payments had al-
ready been made under the invalid regulation-"[t]he egg [had] been scrambled and
there [was] no apparent way to restore the status quo ante").
44 Benefits accrue on both sides of the equation. Keeping a faulty rule in place may
benefit all parties involved. Conversely, vacating an invalid rule may also bring benefits.
Likewise, costs (from either the deficiency prong or the disruption prong) accrue both
from leaving a deficient rule in place and from vacating a deficient rule.
45 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph,J., concur-
ring) ("A remand-only disposition leaves the unlawful rule in place and allows agencies to
postpone responding to the court's merits decision. Agencies do not necessarily give re-
mand-only decisions high priority and may delay action for lengthy periods.").
46 See e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Adm'r of U.S. EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 190 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (remanding without vacating because vacation "would at least temporarily de-
feat... the enhanced protection of the environmental values covered by [the EPA rule at
issue]").
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C. Arguments for Remand Without Vacation
Proponents of RWV make three arguments47: (1) used properly,
RWV is a better remedy for all parties; (2) courts have broad equitable
remedial discretion; and (3) courts can interpret the APA to encom-
pass RWV. 48
1. Remand Without Vacation Is a Better Remedy
For advocates, RWV has three primary salutary effects: (1) it
avoids a regulatory gap caused by vacation, thus maintaining more sta-
bility in the system; (2) it protects the "reliance interests" of regulated
entities, beneficiaries, and the agency; and (3) it allows the agency the
opportunity to correct flawed reasoning that underlies an otherwise
sound rule.49
When a court vacates a rule, the regulated area returns to its un-
regulated state. 50 This may cause concern for one of the parties and
the court.51 For example, like the Ninth Circuit in Western Oil & Gas
Ass'n, the D.C. Circuit in American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA52
found the EPA's particulate-matter regulation invalid.53 Recognizing
the consequences of having no regulation of air contaminants, the
court left the flawed rule in place while the agency corrected the defi-
ciency. 54 The court explained that "vacating a standard because it
may be insufficiently protective would sacrifice such protection as it
now provides, making the best an enemy of the good. ''55
Regulated entities, the agency, and particularly beneficiaries rely
on existing regulations. Once parties structure their lives and busi-
nesses around a regulation, the disruption caused by the regulatory
47 For a look at the first formal debate over RWV, compare Checkosky v. SEC (In re
Checkosky), 23 F.3d 452, 462-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (opinion of Silberman, J.) (declaring
RWV lawful), with id. at 490-93 (opinion of Randolph, J.) (declaring RWV unlawful). For
many of the arguments for and against RWV, see generally Levin, supra note 15, at 305-85
(arguing for RWV); Brian S. Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating Agency Action, 32 SETON
HALL L. REv. 108, 111-51 (2001) (arguing against RWV); Rodriguez, supra note 23, at
607-37 (arguing generally against RWV); Daugirdas, supra note 33, at 285-90 (explaining
arguments for and against RWV).
48 See Levin, supra note 15, at 298-300.
49 See Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 617-18.
50 See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rogers,
J., concurring in part) (per curiam) (explaining that RWV is appropriate because vacating
the Clean Air Interstate Rule would leave an important area unregulated).
51 See, e.g., id. at 1178 ("[Tlhe court has adhered to its traditional position where
vacating would have serious adverse implications for public health and the environment.").
52 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
53 See id. at 528.
54 See id.
55 Id.
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void could be more harmful than the invalid regulation itself.56 Thus,
RWV preserves the status quo until the agency cures the defective
rule, which may require something as simple as additional
reasoning.57
With some invalidated rules, all the agency may need to correct
on remand is its reasoning. 58 Judge Patricia Wald notes that many
remands because of inadequate explanation result merely from "the
agency's failure to communicate or explain to generalist judges what
they are doing, not by the agency's failure to do enough research or
garner sufficient expert opinions for the record."59 Vacating the en-
tire rule can thus impose substantial, seemingly unnecessary costs on
an agency.60
2. Courts Have Broad Equitable Remedial Discretion
The Supreme Court has long recognized the judiciary's need for
flexibility in issuing remedies.61 In Hecht Co. v. Bowles,62 the Court "re-
jected an interpretation of price control legislation that would have
compelled district courts to issue an injunction whenever they found a
violation of that law."'63 More recently, the Court noted that "tradi-
tional equitable principles requiring the balancing of public and pri-
56 SeeRodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (remanding
without vacating because of "the critical importance of the allotment regulations to the
functioning of the entire food stamp system, on which over ten million American families
are now dependent to supplement their food budgets"); Levin, supra note 15, at 298 ("In-
creasingly, therefore, courts now find themselves examining the validity of agency actions
that directly implicate the rights of thousands or millions of persons. Vacation of such an
action can upset a legal regime on which many citizens depend.").
57 See, e.g., Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 252 F.3d 34, 48
(1st Cir. 2001) (giving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on remand the discre-
tion simply to "write a further decision").
58 See id.
59 Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 659, 665-66
(1997).
60 See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1050 (finding agency postremand proceed-
ings took seventeen months on average).
61 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) ("[W]e should not construe a
statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the 'clearest command' or
an 'inescapable inference' to the contrary... (citations omitted)). Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), is a seminal case restricting agencies' ability to
mitigate vacation and thus leading to more use of RWV. See id. at 208-09 (stating that
agencies do not have the authority to promulgate rules that apply retroactively unless ex-
pressly granted by Congress). In Georgetown, the Court held that, absent express statutory
authority, agencies could not retroactively apply rules promulgated in response to vaca-
tion. See id. at 215. Because parties could suffer losses during the gap between the vacation
and the fresh regulation without the possibility of the agency remediating their hardship
after promulgating the new rule, courts began remanding without vacating to compensate
for these losses. See Levin, supra note 15, at 348-53.
62 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
63 Levin, supra note 15, at 310.
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vate interests control the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief in
the federal courts." 64 This long-recognized need for flexibility in tai-
loring judicial remedies lends support to proponents of RWVV. 65
3. Courts Can Interpret the APA to Encompass Remand Without
Vacation
Irrespective of strong functional reasons for RWV, if RWV contra-
dicts the statute, it is unlawful. Supporters must therefore be able to
interpret section 706(2) to allow RVV. Section 706(2) requires that a
reviewing court "shall... set aside agency action... [that is] arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."66 Although detractors claim that "set aside" demands only vaca-
tion, proponents assert that section 706 otherwise uses general lan-
guage allowing for creative judicial interpretation. 67 Further, section
705 confers on courts the power to grant a stay "[o] n such conditions
as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable
injury"-an equitable power.68 Proponents, then, read the statute in
context to give courts sufficient discretion to remand without
vacating.69
Congress has also given courts broad discretion in related con-
texts. For example, Title 28 of the U.S. Code, which discusses the
judiciary generally, provides that a "court of appellate jurisdiction
may... vacate.., any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review, and may remand the cause
and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances. '70 Thus, Congress codified the longstand-
ing need for judicial discretion to fashion unique remedies in the
broader statutory framework in which the APA itself sits. 71 Nonethe-
less, textualists would likely struggle to reconcile RWV with the clear
language of section 706(2).72
64 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1988); see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
65 See Levin, supra note 15, at 324-25 (explaining that the APA drafters incorporated
equitable discretion at the time of drafting).
66 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
67 See Levin, supra note 15, at 312 ("[Section 7061 contains open-ended phrases such
as 'arbitrary and capricious,' 'substantial evidence,' and 'unreasonably delayed,' which
plainly invite judicial creativity.").
68 Id. at 324-25 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705).
69 See id.
70 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
71 See Levin, supra note 15, at 312-13.
72 See id. at 362-63 (admitting that some members of the Court would find RWV hard
to swallow).
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D. Arguments Against Remand Without Vacation
Opponents of RWV counter with (1) functionalist arguments
weighing against the device and, more strongly, (2) statutory-interpre-
tation arguments purportedly invalidating RWV.7 3
1. Opponents'Functionalist Arguments Against Remand Without
Vacation
Left unchecked, RWV threatens to erode hard-look review and
the presumption- of vacation.7 4 Professor Richard Pierce found that
"[t]he vast majority of agency rules" held arbitrary and capricious
would likely meet the Allied-Signal test for RWV. 75 Further, because
agencies know that a flawed rule may remain in force, RWV disincen-
tivizes them from performing competent and exacting rulemaking in
the first instance and from correcting the rule on remand. 76
RWV also threatens to deny effective relief to a party who has
successfully demonstrated that a rule is invalid. 77 As an alternative, if
a court is concerned that the resulting regulatory gap (particularly in
the environmental context) will actually harm the victorious party,
then it can issue a stay of the vacation. 78 This remedy has the twin
advantages of adhering to the letter of section 706(2) while leaving
the rule in place and pressuring the agency to fix the flaw in a speci-
fied time lest the court lift the stay.79
2. Opponents' Statutory Arguments Against Remand Without
Vacation
RWV opponents find strong support in statutory arguments. In a
line of cases inapposite to the RWV cases, the D.C. Circuit has inter-
73 See generally Prestes, supra note 47, at 111-51 (demonstrating the practical difficul-
ties and negative policy implications of employing RWV and pointing to statutory lan-
guage, history, and judicial precedent that undermine the validity of RWV).
74 See id. at 120-21.
75 Pierce, supra note 32, at 75-76.
76 SeeJerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Cultu~e: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 295 (1987) ("The idea that an agency can or will
quickly turn to remedying the factual or analytic defects in its remanded rule is surely
naive, however minor those problems might appear in the abstract."); Daugirdas, supra
note 33, at 280-81 ("[T]he regular use of RWV by courts may reduce the incentives for
agencies to engage in carefully reasoned decisionmaking."); id. at 302-04 (illustrating ex-
tensive agency delays in responding to RWV).
77 See Levin, supra note 15, at 298 (explaining how RWV can deprive deserving parties
of relief because RWV disincentivizes parties from litigating "official mistakes" and reduces
the incentive for agencies to render lawful decisions).
78 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he losing agency may always file a post-decision motion for a stay of the man-
date showing why its unlawful rule or order should continue to govern until proceedings
on remand are completed.").
79 See id. at 11-12. But see infra note 199.
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preted the language "shall... set aside" to mean that it must vacate.80
A simple search of dictionary definitions of "set aside"81 coupled with
the Court's direction that "'shall' . . . normally creates an obligation
impervious to judicial discretion"82 confirm this reading.8 3
Supreme Court precedent also supports a formalist reading of
section 706(2). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, for ex-
ample, the Court wrote that "[i]n all cases agency action must be set
aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.' ,,84 Congress purposefully lim-
ited the discretion of the courts by passing the APA, which "estab-
lishe[s] the maximum procedural requirements [for] ... courts [to]
impose upon federal agencies in conducting rulemaking
proceedings."85
In response to the argument that courts have broad equitable dis-
cretion, Judge A. Raymond Randolph asserts that equity cases are in-
apposite to the mandate of section 706(2):
[J]udicial review of agency rulemaking is not a traditional proceed-
ing in equity. Nor do I believe that a challenge to an agency rule in
an enforcement action seeking a fine or a penalty is in the nature of
an action in equity.
Furthermore, [Supreme Court precedent] . . . does not pre-
serve a court's remedial discretion even in injunction actions if Con-
80 See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
494 F.3d 188, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341,
354 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 430 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Southern Co. Servs. v. Fed. Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n, 416 F.3d 39, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA,
402 F.3d 1249, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Bell Ad. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 182 F.3d 30, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1999); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d
1215, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1999); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 86 F.3d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Mobile Commc'ns Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Steel Mfrs.
Ass'n v. EPA, 27 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Checkosky v. SEC (In re Checkosky),
23 F.3d 452, 492 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (listing numerous pre-1994 cases).
81 See Prestes, supra note 47, at 130-31 (equating "set aside" with "vacate" based on
several dictionaries' definitions).
82 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998).
83 See Prestes, supra note 47, at 129-32.
84 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971); see
also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam) ("If [the agency's] finding is not
sustainable on the administrative record made, then the ... decision must be vacated and
the matter remanded to [the agency] for further consideration." (emphasis added)).
85 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978).
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gress has limited the discretion in clear terms. To my mind,
§ 706(2) (A) is stated in clear terms.8 6
Thus, the argument goes, Congress has spoken clearly, and courts
must follow the letter of the APA.8 7 In sum, opponents claim that the
perceived benefits of RWV are illusory and that the text of sec-
tion 706(2) forecloses any option other than vacation. 88
Even if opponents are winning the theoretical argument, they are
losing the judicial war.89 RWV has spread from the D.C. Circuit.90
Because its use will likely continue to flourish, 9 1 litigants must be pre-
pared to brief-and courts must be ready to decide-whether and
how to apply the device appropriately. This Note does not argue
whether RWV is lawful. Rather, it uses existing rationales to justify
excluding RWV from environmental deregulatory cases.
II
SETTING THE STAGE FOR HEIGHTENED Focus ON
VACATION REQUESTS
A. Agricultural Biotechnology
Breeders have been using "conventional genetic techniques" to
crossbreed plants for years.9 2 Many common foods are products of
such hybridization-a nectarine is an example of a genetically altered
peach. 93 Modern genetic engineering uses recombinant DNA and
cell fusion to introduce, for example, "traits from bacteria or animals
into plants. '9 4 By this process, seed manufacturers such as Monsanto
can produce crops that are resistant to herbicides, allowing farmers to
apply the chemicals without damaging the plant.
95
86 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 10 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., concur-
ring) (internal citation omitted).
87 Id. at 10.
88 See, e.g., id.
89 See, e.g., Comit6 de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis, Civil Action No. 09-
240, 2010 WL 3431761, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (implementing RWV).
90 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
91 See infra Part III.
92 See Agricultural Research and Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutri-
tion, &Forestry, 106th Cong. 209 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement ofJames H. Mary-
anski, Biotechnology Coordinator, Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Food and
Drug Administration).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 209-10. ("The United States uses the term genetic modification to refer to all
forms of breeding, both modern, i.e. genetic engineering, and conventional.") This Note
uses the terms "genetically modified," "genetically modified organism," and "genetically
engineered" interchangeably.
95 See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub
nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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GM seeds purportedly create a number of risks.96 As farmers
douse crops with greater amounts of herbicide, weeds become in-
creasingly resistant, giving rise to "superweeds."97 In turn, farmers es-
calate the battle and spray more potent herbicides. 98 Also, GM seed
can pollinate farmers' non-GM crops.99 Because seed manufacturers
patent their GM seeds,100 if they discover their seeds growing on a
farm that has not purchased the product, they may bring suit against
the farmer. 101 Further, some domestic markets refuse to purchase
GM food10 2 and some countries prohibit its importation.1 0 3
While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates GM
food that can eventually find its way to the dinner table, 10 4 the USDA
is responsible for regulating GM crops. 10 5 The Plant Protection Act
gives the USDA the power to regulate "plant pests."' 0 6 The Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), part of the USDA, has
96 But see BIOTECHNOLOGIES UNIT, EUROPEAN COMM'N, A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO
RESEARCH (2001-2010) 15-17 (2010) (surveying studies finding GMOs no riskier than al-
ternative technologies).
97 SeeJames Randerson, Genetically-Modified Superweeds "Not Uncommon, " NEWSCIENTIST
(Feb. 5, 2002, 3:34 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn882-geneticallymodi-
fied-superweeds-not-uncommon.html; see also Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the possibility that GM crops could "contaminat[e] other plants and
breed[ ] a new type of pesticide-resistant weed").
98 See Randerson, supra note 97; cf ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTSJ1O1 ANDJ163: REQUEST FOR NON-
REGULATED STATUS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. G at G-4 (2010) (dis-
cussing the risk of "rapid shifts" of herbicide-resistant weeds "if best management practices
are not utilized").
99 See CATHERINE L. MOVES & PHILIP J. DALE, JOHN INNES CENTRE, ORGANIC FARMING
AND GENE TRANSFER FROM GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 2-20 (1999), http://org-
prints.org/8260/1/F0157-2153-FRP.pdf.
100 Johanns, 541 F.3d at 941.
101 See, e.g., Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1. S.C.R. 902
(Can.) (finding that defendant "used" Monsanto's patented GM cell by cultivating seeds
that blew onto the defendant's farm but denying damages because the defendant gained
no unjust advantage); Saved Seed and Farmer Lawsuits, MONSANTO, http://
www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/saved-seed-farmer-lawsuits.aspx (last visited Oct. 21,
2011) (noting that Monsanto has filed suit against U.S. farmers 145 times since 1997).
102 See Elizabeth Weise, Biotech Corn Mixes with Beans, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2002, 4:08
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2002-11-13-biotech-corn-usatx.htm.
103 See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE TRADE ISSUES SURROUNDING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 1-2 (2005), http://www.pew-
trusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food-andBiotechnology/Biotech_
USEU1205.pdf ("In June 2005 ... a qualified majority of the Council of Ministers refused
to lift certain EU member state bans on GM products that had been approved by the
Commission, creating new doubts about the viability of an EU-wide policy on GM crops,
food and feed."); cf. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2762 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Farmers and scientists opined that RRA could contaminate al-
falfa that has not been genetically modified, destroying the American export market for
alfalfa . . ").
104 See Hearing, supra note 92, at 208-12 (statement of James H. Maryanski).
105 See 7 U.S.C. § 7712 (2006).
106 Id. § 7712(c).
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promulgated regulations under which "certain genetically engineered
plants are presumed to be 'plant pests'-and thus 'regulated arti-
cles." 107 Because a GM seed is a regulated article, a grower cannot
plant the seed without a permit.10 8
However, anyone may petition APHIS to deregulate a given
seed. 109 If APHIS attempts to deregulate a genetically modified or-
ganism (GMO), other federal environmental laws are implicated. For
example, the agency might need to conduct an endangered-species
analysis under the Endangered Species Act. 110 Similarly, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) demands that before der-
egulation can occur APHIS must produce an environmental impact
statement (EIS) that assesses the potential environmental and health
impacts of deregulating the GM seed.'1 '
B. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms
In 2004, Monsanto petitioned APHIS to deregulate its Roundup
Ready Alfalfa, the first crop genetically engineered to resist an herbi-
cide-Monsanto's Roundup weed killer-and to "transmit the geneti-
cally engineered gene to other plants."' 12 The following year, APHIS
agreed to deregulate the alfalfa but decided that a full EIS was unnec-
essary.113 Conventional (non-GM) alfalfa farmers, including Geertson
Seed Farms, Inc., brought suit to compel APHIS to prepare an EIS. 114
After the district court ruled against APHIS on the merits, the court
vacated the deregulation (once again turning Roundup Ready Alfalfa
into a regulated article), ordered preparation of an EIS, and enjoined
future planting of Roundup Ready Alfalfa pending completion of the
EIS. 115 The Ninth Circuit affirmedi" 6
The Supreme Court considered only the propriety of injunctive
relief and held that even in the context of NEPA, injunctive relief is
still a "drastic and extraordinary remedy" that requires surmounting
107 Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2749 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0(a) (2) & n.1, 340.1, 340.2, 340.6
(2010)).
108 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.3 (2011).
109 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2750.
110 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
111 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2750.
112 Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub
nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010); see also infra Part III.A
(discussing NEPA).
114 SeeJohanns, 541 F.3d at 942.
115 Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 1302981, at *9
(N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007), affd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th
Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
116 Johanns, 541 F.3d at 948.
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the "traditional four-factor test."' 17 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the
Court ruled that the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting
all planting of the GM alfalfa and enjoining APHIS from possibly ef-
fecting a partial deregulation. Importantly, the Court reasoned that
because the district court's vacation of APHIS's deregulation had the
same effect as the injunction-prohibiting planting-"no recourse to
the additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was
warranted."11 8
Indeed, the vacate-and-remand order still required APHIS to
complete a full EIS before determining whether it could fully deregu-
late the GM seed. 119 An EIS takes on average 3.6 years, but can take as
long as twelve years.' 20 For proregulatory parties who believe that GE
food "pose[s] serious risks to humans, domesticated animals, wildlife
and the environment,"' 2 1 vacation could significantly help their cause
by slowing deregulation.1 22 On the other hand, this could have a sub-
stantial economic impact on GM seed manufacturers and farmers-
the GMO industry helps produce over 90% of U.S. acres of beets, 23
up to 45% of U.S. corn, 85% of soybeans, and an estimated 70%-75%
of processed foods on supermarket shelves. 124 Geertson has thus set
the stage for fierce battles over not only the merits of deregulatory
cases but also the proper remedy if a court invalidates the
deregulation.
117 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2756, 2761 ("[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demon-
strate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is war-
ranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."
(alteration in original) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006))). The four-factor test for obtaining permanent injunctive relief has raised a few
eyebrows. Some commentators question whether such a test is "traditional" at all and to
what extent courts should apply it. Gergen et al., supra note 2. Lower courts, however,
have vigorously applied the test, see id., lending credence to the conclusion in Part III that
vacation requests will continue to increase.
118 Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761 ("[W]e do know that the vacatur of APHIS's deregula-
tion decision means that virtually no [Roundup Ready Alfalfa] can be grown or sold until
such time as a new deregulation decision is in place.").
119 See id. at 2747.
120 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Govern-
ment's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 918-19 (2002); Evaluating the
Performance of Environmental Streamlining: Development of a NEPA Baseline for Measuring Contin-
uous Performance, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/strmlng/
baseline/section4.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
121 See Genetically Engineered Crops, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/campaign/genetically-engineered-food/crops/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
122 See Redick, supra note 5 ("With more limited launches and legal challenges to EIS
findings ahead .... innovation in biotech crops may suffer over the coming decade.").
123 Id.
124 Genetically Engineered Crops, supra note 121.
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III
WHy Focus WILL SHIFT TO VACATION REQUESTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. Legal Reasons Focus Will Shift to Vacation Requests
Focus will shift to vacation because the Supreme Court has made
permanent injunctive relief more difficult to obtain. 125 Vacation, by
contrast, is precisely the default remedy that the APA requires courts
to impose for arbitrary and capricious agency action. 126 Particularly
in the context of NEPA after Geertson and Winter, parties may forego
the burdensome four-factor test for a permanent injunction and in-
stead ask solely for vacation.
NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental im-
pact of any proposal for "major [f] ederal action [ ]" that "significantly
affect[s] the quality of the human environment."' 12 7 Attempted der-
egulation likely qualifies as such a proposal.1 28 Under NEPA, an
agency must either (1) prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to
determine if any impact will be significant, and, if so, prepare an EIS,
or (2) prepare an EIS in the first instance. 129 But the Supreme Court
has interpreted NEPA's mandate as purely procedural-all NEPA re-
quires is informed decision making, not any substantive outcome.1 30
An agency must jump through the procedural hoops (which can take
many years), but once the proper assessment is complete, the respec-
tive proposal can likely move forward as planned. The Roundup
Ready Alfalfa at issue in Geertson is a prime example. In January 2011,
APHIS again deregulated the seed after completion of an EIS.13 1
Nonetheless, NEPA still has force because it can substantially delay a
project, sometimes mitigating a project's environmental impact. 132
Historically, plaintiffs have sought remedial relief in the form of
an injunction for NEPA violations.13 3 If the project or proposal at is-
sue continues during the pendency of the litigation, the entire reason
for the suit-assessing environmental impacts before the action oc-
125 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010); supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
128 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
129 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3-.4 (2011) (setting forth whether and when to prepare an EA
and an EIS).
130 See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (per curiam).
131 See Roundup Ready Alfalfa, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/
Pages/roundup-ready-alfalfa-supreme-court.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). On March 18,
2011, the Center for Food Safety again filed suit, fighting deregulation of Roundup Ready
Alfalfa. See id.
132 See Karkkainen, supra note 120, at 929.
133 See MANDELKER, supra note 10, § 4:52.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:405
curs-could become moot.1 3 4 But Geertson reminded prospective liti-
gants that, even under NEPA, injunctive relief requires hurdling the
four-factor test.135 In Geertson, Winter, and Center for Food Safety v. Vii-
sack, a recent district court case concerning deregulation of a GM
crop, t 36 the plaintiffs failed to show that the likelihood of irreparable
harm warranted injunction. 13 7
With injunctive relief now harder to obtain, 138 plaintiffs will work
swiftly to convince a court to vacate the challenged EA or EIS. Chal-
lenges to agency deregulation will likely often implicate an agency's
failure to prepare an EIS, as Geertson, Winter, and Center for Food Safety
demonstrate. 139 Vacating a deregulation based on an inadequate en-
vironmental review would arguably achieve the same result as an in-
junction-halt the action at hand. 140  With environmental cases
arising under NEPA every year,' 4 ' a proportionate increase in requests
solely for vacation (as opposed to requests for both vacation and in-
junction) is now likely. Moreover, in Geertson, the Supreme Court es-
sentially gave its imprimatur for plaintiffs to challenge a partial
deregulation while the agency completes a court-ordered EIS. t4
2
B. Factual Reasons Focus Will Shift to Vacation Requests
Agricultural biotechnology is a big business that has a strong in-
centive to fight hard for the deregulation of GM seed. 143 Genetically
engineered crops not only produce vast profits but also account for a
large and growing amount of the food that Americans consume. As of
134 See id.
135 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010).
136 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010); infra Part IV.
137 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761-62; Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20-24 (2008); Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
138 See, e.g., Reed v. Salazar, 744 F. Supp. 2d 98, 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying injunctive
relief but ordering vacation); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
'39 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761-62; Winter, 555 U.S. at 31-33; Ctr. for Food Safety, 734
F. Supp. 2d at 950.
140 See Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Where an EIS is required, allowing a potentially environmentally damaging project to
proceed prior to its preparation runs contrary to the very purpose of the statutory require-
ment."), abrogated by Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761.
141 NEPA does not provide for judicial review-thus, the APA creates the cause of
action and sets "arbitrary and capricious" as the standard of review. See Davis v. Mineta, 302
F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts must consider whether an
agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously when considering whether the governmental ac-
tion will significantly affect the human environment).
142 See Geertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2761 ("[W]e also know that any party aggrieved by a hypo-
thetical future [partial] deregulation decision will have ample opportunity to challenge it,
and to seek appropriate preliminary relief, if and when such a decision is made.").
143 See generally CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETv, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 4-5 (2004), http://
www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReportl.13.05.pdf [hereinafter
CFS REPORT] (describing how Monsanto invested its resources in litigation against farmers
to protect its profitable GM seed patents).
422
VA CA TION A T THE FARM
2007, seven million farmers in eighteen countries grew genetically en-
gineered crops.1 44 The global cultivation of GM crops expanded 10%
every year from 1996 to 2003.145 One major company alone invested,
in a single year, "85 percent of its research and development budget
in seeds, genomics and biotechnology, a total investment of over $430
million.1 46 And in 2004, herbicide-resistant engineering technology
accounted for 85% of all U.S. soy acreage, 45% of all corn acre-
age, and 76% of all cotton acreage, and in 2003, 84% of U.S. canola
acreage.1 47 An ever-present market and an expanding global popula-
tion will likely keep up demand for increased crop productivity. 148
The potential for hefty profit margins combined with the food sup-
ply's reliance on GM crops will incentivize interested companies to
push for deregulation of GM seed and fight proregulatory
litigation.149
Groups concerned about the negative effects of GM crops on
health and the environment as well as farmers intent on using exclu-
sively non-GM seed are poised to fight with equal fervor to maintain
the regulation of GMOs. 150 Regulatory advocates argue that GM food
may be harmful to people suffering from chronic diseases1 51 and may
produce pests resistant to natural pesticides, jeopardizing all non-GM
crops.1 52  These advocates claim that contamination of nonbi-
otechnology crops has already "impacted tens of thousands of farm-
ers . .. [and] affected nearly every major commercial crop in the
United States."' 53
144 PEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
'45 Id.
146 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 7. Investment in educational research has in-
creased as well. See id. at 10 ("[T]he direction of land-grant university research has been
shifting away from producing new conventional seed varieties and toward biotech
applications.").
147 Id. at 8-9; see also GRAHAM BROOKES & PETER BARFOOT, PG EcoN. LTD., CO-EXIS-
TENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: CAN GM CROPS BE GROWN WITH CONVENTIONAL
AND ORGANIC CROPS? 8 tbl.1 (2004), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/Coexistencere-
portNAmericafinalJune2004.pdf; ANNE HILLSON, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, A NEW VIEW OF
U.S. AGRICULTURE 2 (2006), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/US_-Ag__Report.pdf
("Food ingredients from [genetically modified corn and soy] are found in hundreds if not
thousands of processed foods in American supermarkets.").
148 Cf HILLSON, supra note 147, at 2 ("[T]he vast majority of foods produced in the
U.S. are not gene altered.").
149 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 23 (noting one company with a department of
seventy-five employees and an annual budget of $10 million for patent infringement litiga-
tion against farmers).
150 See Li, supra note 4, at 3 ("[T] he organic food industry will fight the expansion of
genetically modified food until the cows come home.").
151 See FOOD SAFETY: CONTAMINANTS AND ToxINs 369 (J.P.F. D'Mello ed., 2003).
152 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 8.
153 Id. at 14; supra Part II.A.
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APHIS's current process for deregulating GM seed 154 also frus-
trates those concerned about GMOs. As APHIS explains, "[m]ost
plants are field-tested under notification, a streamlined process that
takes up to 30 days for a decision.... Once [APHIS's Biotechnology
Regulatory Services (BRS)] has granted a product nonregulatory sta-
tus, the product may be freely.., planted without the requirement of
permits or other regulatory oversight by BRS.' 1 5 5 Notifications com-
prise the "vast majority of [field] trials.' 1 56 However, according to the
Center for Food Safety, the USDA "rarely conducts [e]nvironmental
[a]ssessments . . .prior to GE field trials."'1 57 The Center for Food
Safety asserts that when the USDA does conduct EAs, they are often
woefully inadequate at detecting potential harm to non-GM crops. 158
Without such regulatory controls, contamination of non-GM crops is
almost inevitable. 59
Fueling the fire is a recent move by APHIS, which, regulatory ad-
vocates are likely to claim, circumvents the deregulatory process. In
2010, the Scotts Miracle-Gro Company requested that APHIS confirm
that Scotts' Roundup-resistant Kentucky bluegrass does not qualify as
a regulated article because it has been genetically modified "without
using plant pest components.' 160 On July 1, 2011, APHIS issued a let-
ter confirming that the Kentucky bluegrass is not a regulated article
154 See BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BRS FACTSHEET:
USDA's BIOTECHNOLOGY DEREGULATION PROCESS 1-2 (2006), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
publications/biotechnology/content/printable version/BRS FS -biodereg_02-06.pdf; cf
BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic., BRS FACTSHEET: APHIS Bio-
TECHNOLOGY: PERMITTING PROGRESS INTO TOMoRROw 1 (2006), http://www.aphis.usda.
gov/publications/biotechnology/content/printable-version/BRS-FS-permitprogress-02-
06.pdf [hereinafter APHIS FACTSHEET] ("Genetically engineered (GE) organisms are big
news-corn that resist attacks by insect pests, papayas that are resistant to viruses, and
bananas that might one day carry vaccines to developing countries are all made possible by
the science of biotechnology. Newspapers and magazines regularly announce the latest
advancements in the great biotechnology race. While many products are already on the
market, many more are being developed and tested every day.").
155 APHIS FACTSHEET, supra note 154, at 1-2.
156 See DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, CONTAMINATING THE WILD? 10
(2006), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/Contaminating-theWild-Report.pdf.
157 See id. at 3.
158 See id.
159 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 37 ("The concern that cross-pollination (also
referred to as 'genetic drift') is unavoidable was confirmed by a British Royal Society report
that found hybridization between plants to be pervasive, frequent, and not limited by physi-
cal barriers such as buffer zones.").
160 See Letter from Richard Shank, Senior Vice President, Regulatory & Gov't Affairs,
The Scotts Miracle-Gro Co., to Tom Vilsack, U.S. Sec'y of Agric. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/scottskbg.pdf; see also Brandon Keim, Genetically Modi-
fied Gross Could Make Superweed Problem Worse, WIRED SCI. (July 11, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://
www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/07/engineered-bluegrass/ (discussing the contro-
versy over Scotts Miracle-Gro's Kentucky bluegrass regulation exemption).
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and thus is not subject to the Plant Protection Act.16 1 Since the seed is
not, and never has been, a regulated article, APHIS can claim that it
has taken no deregulatory action that requires preparation of an EIS.
This paves the way for other GM seed manufacturers to attempt what
arguably amounts to an end run around the formal deregulatory pro-
cess. 162 Lawsuits challenging the legality of this action without prepar-
ing an EIS are likely to emerge.
The potential economic threat that genetically engineered crops
bring to farmers also points to an increase in litigation over GM seed
deregulation. In 2002, for example, GM corn contaminated and ru-
ined 500,000 bushels of soybeans.1 63 Similarly, because the European
Union (EU) maintains stricter regulation of genetically engineered
foods, the United States could "lose as much as $4 billion annually in
agricultural exports."164
These examples, combined with the potential health and envi-
ronmental risks associated with GM crops, will likely bring conven-
tional and organic growers to the courtroom. Likewise, agricultural
biotechnology companies will continue to push for and defend der-
egulation. The Supreme Court has thus laid the groundwork for
heightened focus on vacation requests in environmental deregulatory
cases, particularly for those dealing with agricultural biotechnology.
C. Heightened Focus on Vacation Requests Will Place Pressure
on Courts to Consider Remand Without Vacation
With increased pressure to vacate deregulatory actions, courts,
prompted by seed manufacturers as parties to the litigation, will likely
seek to mitigate the consequences of vacation. Historically, when
courts have granted RWV in environmental cases, they have looked
primarily to whether vacating the regulation at issue would be so se-
verely disruptive that keeping the defective regulation in place would
be preferable to having no regulation at all. 165 Even if the rule cannot
161 Letter from Michael C. Gregoire, Deputy Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Agric., to Richard
Shank, Senior Vice President, Regulatory & Gov't Affairs, The Scotts Miracle-Gro Co. (July
1, 2011), http://www.gaia-health.com/articles451/000489-usdaresponse.pdf.
162 See Tom Philpott, Wait, Did the USDA Just Deregulate All New Genetically Modified
Crops?, MOTHER JONES (July 8, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://motherjones.com/environment/
2011/07/usda-deregulate-roundup-gmo-tom-philpott.
163 See Weise, supra note 102.
164 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 14; Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.
Ct. 2743, 2762 (2010) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("[G]enetic contamination from RRA could
decimate farmers' livelihoods and the American alfalfa market for years to come."). But see
Food Safety - From the Farm to the Fork, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/
gmregister/index-en.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (listing GMOs authorized in the
EU).
165 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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be cured, courts have used "ad hoc balancing" to determine whether
RWV is proper, staving off the disruptive impact of vacation. 166
As agricultural biotechnology companies and agencies pushing
deregulation face an increasing number of lawsuits requesting vaca-
tion, these parties will likely adapt their strategy to argue for RWVV. 167
Deregulatory proponents can use arguments typically made by conser-
vation groups in environmental suits' 68 to advocate for leaving the
deregulation of GM seed in place. The presence of some reliance
interest is essential to the granting of RWV.169 By the time a biotech
deregulatory case reaches a court, many farmers will likely already
have planted the GM seed at issue. 170 Although vacation might affect
only future planting, 171 reregulating the seed could still significantly
harm not only the farmers and companies themselves but also the in-
tended beneficiaries of the GM crops, such as food companies, super-
markets, and general consumers of GM food. 172
A court would balance these interests against the seriousness of
the deficiency (or absence) of the environmental review. This inquiry
amounts to analyzing the threat that continued planting of GM crops
without an adequate environmental review might pose to non-GM
farmers. 173 Industry and the agency can argue that vacating the der-
egulation would be of little benefit-it would not vitiate the risk of
cross contamination because the court would likely not order the de-
struction of GM seed already in the ground at the time of trial.174
Moreover, because APHIS has already deregulated a number of GM
crops, 175 the findings of the EIS would serve as a mere formality, re-
sulting in deregulation down the road. Like other RWV cases where
the agency could fix its reasoning on remand, 176 APHIS could merely
"cure" the defect.
166 See Levin, supra note 15, at 380-81.
167 See, e.g., Federal Defendants' Reply Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petitions for
Review of Agency Action at 30, Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-2008-CM/DJW, 2011 WL 2579799, at *15 (D. Kan.June 28, 2011) (argu-
ing that the Tenth Circuit should import the Allied-Signal test if it found the Corps' EA
inadequate).
168 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 559 F.3d at 528.
169 See Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 618.
170 See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
171 See id. at 955.
172 See HILLSON, supra note 147, at 2 (noting the widespread use of deregulated GM
crops like soybeans and corn in thousands of processed foods in American supermarkets).
173 See Levin, supra note 15, at 380.
174 See Or. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
175 See supra Part III.B.
176 See, e.g., Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 252 F.3d 34, 47
(1st Cir. 2001) (tailoring the remand order to allow the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission to correct the errors and omissions in its original hearing).
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Agricultural biotechnology companies that strategically reframe
the consequences of vacating deregulation could bring (and have al-
ready brought)177 RWV within the purview of courts considering the
likely onslaught of cases in this realm. As the next Part of this Note
demonstrates, however, courts should not extend RWV to this con-
text. Doing so would undermine the best interests of the judiciary,
the agencies, the parties, and the public.
IV
COURTS SHOULD NOT EXTEND REMAND WITHOUT VACATION
TO ENVIRONMENTAL DEREGULATORY CASES
Aside from RWV's dubious legality, strong reasons militate
against extending RWV to environmental deregulatory cases. Center
for Food Safety, the first and only post-Geertson case to consider a chal-
lenge to the deregulation of a GM crop, serves as a model for why
RWV is a grossly inadequate remedy.
Center for Food Safety involved the deregulation of Monsanto's GM
sugar beets. 178 In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California ordered APHIS to conduct a full EIS on GM sugar
beets. The Center for Food Safety court denied the plaintiffs' request for
a permanent injunction, citing Geertson, though it expressed concern
about APHIS's failure to prepare an EIS before deregulating the
crop. 179
The court then applied the Allied-Signal test to determine if it
should remand without vacating. It began by noting that the Ninth
Circuit has issued RWV only in environmental cases where it was con-
cerned that vacating the existing regulation would cause "irreparable
environmental injury."180 In Center for Food Safety, however, the defen-
dant biotechnology companies focused on the "economic conse-
quences."' 8 ' The court expressed doubt that economic harm could
ever form the basis for RWV. Regardless, the defendants had "failed
to demonstrate that serious economic harm would be incurred pend-
ing a full environmental review. ' 182 The court was also concerned
that defendants were not taking the process "seriously," since defend-
ants asserted that APHIS would simply find deregulation proper after
completing the EIS.18 3 Ultimately, the Center for Food Safety court va-
cated APHIS's deregulatory decision. 184
177 See Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 951-55.
178 734 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
179 See id. at 950, 955.
180 See id. at 951, 953.
181 Id. at 953.
182 Id. at 954.
183 Id. at 953.
184 See id. at 955.
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Center for Food Safety should give proregulatory litigants pause be-
cause, even though the court rejected RWV, it considered RWV as an
option.185 Importantly, however, Center for Food Safety illustrates two
principles: (1) RWV is inadequate as a remedy for environmental der-
egulatory cases and (2) even if a court applies the Allied-Signal test,
RWV should fail as the remedy.
A. Remand Without Vacation Is an Inadequate Remedy for
Environmental Deregulation
Center for Food Safety shows that deregulatory cases are the mirror
image of the environmental cases in which courts often issue RWV
orders.' 8 6 For example, the court in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v.
Babbitt left in place a defective regulation meant to protect an endan-
gered snail species.'8 7 Absent RWV, by the time the agency promul-
gated a new regulation, the reason for its enactment could have been
moot-the species might already have been extinct.'88 In the deregu-
latory context, the opposite is true. Remanding without vacating
would actually ensure that the risky environmental activity would re-
main unregulated. Only by vacating could the court safeguard the
interests the regulation aims to protect while the agency determines
whether deregulation would indeed pose no risk to environmental
degradation. 189 Particularly in the recent agricultural biotechnology
cases, the faulty deregulation is not merely a "curable defect."'190 Only
by conducting the required EIS will the agency know the extent of the
disruptive consequences of the deregulation.191 Just as a regulatory
environmental suit presents the strongest case for a court to employ
RWV, so does a deregulatory environmental suit present the strongest
case for a court to refrain from using RWV. 192
In fact, in Geertson, the Court partly rested its reversal of the na-
tionwide injunction on the premise that the vacation achieved the
same effect as the injunction-it prohibited planting pending the
185 See id. at 953-55.
186 Compare id. at 950-55 (vacating and remanding because of the risk of crop contami-
nation while AHIPS was preparing an EIS), with Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d
512, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (remanding without vacation so environmental protections could
remain in place until the EPA cured the defective regulation).
187 See 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995).
188 See id.
189 If a court leaves an agency's deregulation decision intact while waiting for the
agency to complete an EIS, contamination by GM crops could occur in the interim and
could not be undone.
190 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 559 F.3d at 528.
191 See Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
192 Again, the legality of RWV is beyond the scope of this Note.
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completion of the EIS. 193 Remanding without vacating would run
counter to the Court's rationale.
Interestingly, a deregulatory challenge under NEPA presents the
most powerful case for rejecting RWV precisely because NEPA is a
procedural statute. NEPA is concerned solely with informed decision
making. 194 If a court finds an EA or EIS inadequate but remands to
the agency without vacating the deregulation, then no possibility
exists for the agency to make a fully informed decision before taking
the "[m] ajor If] ederal action[ ].-195 The very action the EIS would be
meant to evaluate-deregulation-would already have occurred. This
would undermine the purpose of NEPA.1 96
RWV is particularly harmful to the judiciary in the deregulatory
context because it risks continuing the trend of administrative agen-
cies ignoring judicial orders, or at least significantly delaying renewal
of the requisite rulemaking process. 197 Under an RWV order, agen-
cies would have less incentive to thoroughly conduct a statutorily man-
dated procedure, such as an EIS.198 Agencies would know that a
remand would be toothless-the deregulation would remain in place
even if a court ordered the agency to conduct the flouted
procedure. 199
Over time, RWV would be similarly harmful to administrative
agencies implementing the erroneous deregulation. With little incen-
tive to cure the faulty deregulation, the agency risks losing the public
193 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010).
194 See supra Part III.A.
195 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4-.5 (2011).
196 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (per curiam) (outlining the purpose of NEPA as promoting informed decision
making). Of course, this risk exists in most NEPA cases. If a court were to remand without
vacating a case involving, for example, an inadequate EIS for a construction project, the
project may be finished long before the agency rectifies the EIS. This calls into question
the Court's reasoning in Winter regarding injunctive relief in a NEPA case.
197 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
198 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
199 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., concur-
ring) (noting that courts can tailor a vacate-and-remand order to address concerns arising
from complete vacation). A court can require the agency to file a motion to stay the vaca-
tion "showing why its unlawful rule or order should continue to govern until proceedings
on remand are completed." Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct.
2743, 2767 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the ability to stay a vacation). By
contrast, "[a] remand-only disposition leaves the unlawful rule in place and allows agencies
to postpone responding to the court's merits decision. Agencies do not necessarily give
remand-only decisions high priority and may delay action for lengthy periods." Comcast
Corp., 579 F.3d at 12 (Randolph, J., concurring). But, despite this protestation, a court can
achieve similar tailoring with RWV. See Cook Inletkeeper v. U.S. EPA, 400 F. App'x 239,
241-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (enforcing deadlines for compliance on remand). Although either
alternative (stay of the vacation or RWV with time-sensitive requirements) might pressure
the agency to correct its invalid action more quickly, the flawed deregulation remains in
place, risking the harm that the vacation order and the EIS aim to address.
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trust. The success of notice-and-comment rulemaking depends upon
the public's perception that an agency follows all aspects of the ad-
ministrative process for regulation and deregulation. 200 Granted, in-
terested parties would likely be more aware of whether a given agency
takes account of their comments in the resulting deregulation or reg-
ulation than parties would be aware of a court order. Nonetheless,
those same parties who commented during the deregulatory process
would also likely take note of whether an agency abides by the terms
of a judicial order requiring, for example, the agency to conduct an
EIS. RWV would disincentivize an agency to conduct the EIS in a
timely manner, risking erosion of the public's confidence in the
agency's process.
Moreover, an agency can respond flexibly to vacation. In Geert-
son, APHIS could have partially deregulated the GM seed in response
to the vacation order "during the pendency of the EIS process." 20 1
Thus, both courts and the agency possess a finer tool than RWV with
which to tailor a vacation order.
Excluding RWV from environmental deregulatory cases clearly
benefits parties opposing deregulation. 20 2 For example, it assuages
concerns that deregulation of GM seed threatens conventional or or-
ganic crops with contamination. 20 3 Vacation maintains the status quo
pending completion of the EIS.20 4
The benefit to advocates of deregulation is admittedly less clear.
At least in the agricultural-biotechnology subset of environmental
cases, benefits may accrue in the long term. A full EIS would allow
more comprehensive study of the environmental impacts of GM
crops. This could lead to additional studies concerning the human
health effects of genetically engineered foods. 20 5 Depending on the
results, such studies could lend credibility to industry claims about the
safety and utility of GM food. A consensus within the scientific com-
munity could bolster public support and, in turn, hasten the infusion
of GM seed into the marketplace. The full disclosure and data pro-
duced might lead to increased exportation of such foods, enabling
companies to tap into the four-billion-dollar foreign market.20 6
200 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 40-43 (1995) (discussing the importance of public trust for effective
rulemaking).
201 See Ceertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2754.
202 See Li, supra note 4, at 1-2.
203 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 14.
204 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
205 The results of such studies could, of course, be detrimental to biotechnology com-
panies if research showed GM food to be harmful.
206 See CFS REPORT, supra note 143, at 14.
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Even if this long-term prospect proved illusory, domestic consum-
ers would still receive more information about the impact of geneti-
cally engineered foods. At the very least, delaying deregulation would
ensure more careful consideration of potentially ill effects on conven-
tional, organic, and wild crops. 20 7
B. If a Court Applies the Allied-SignalTest, Remand Without
Vacation Should Fail as the Remedy
The two cases that have held the deregulation of GM seed invalid
have resulted in vacation. 208 Center for Food Safety provides a ready ex-
ample of why even if a court employs the Allied-Signal test, the result
should be vacation. As referenced above, the test is two-pronged:
"The decision whether to vacate depends on the seriousness of the
order's deficiencies ... and the disruptive consequences of an interim
change that may itself be changed." 20 9 The district court in Center for
Food Safety found that the environmental deregulation was invalid and
that the plaintiffs demonstrated that "deregulation [might] signifi-
cantly affect the environment. '" 210 The deficiency was great enough
that APHIS could not, in other words, "rehabilitate its rationale for
the [de]regulation" on remand.211
The deficiency prong of the Allied-Signal test weighs heavily in
favor of vacation. Unlike a mere inadequate explanation, easily cor-
rected on remand,21 2 a flawed EIS is a significant deficiency. The dis-
trict court in Center for Food Safety even chastised the defendants for
"not taking this process seriously" when they asserted that the EIS was
merely a procedural hurdle and that APHIS would simply affirm its
decision after preparing an EIS. 213 Leaving the flawed deregulation
in place could significantly affect non-GM crops in the interim.
The disruption prong also tilts in favor of vacation. In Center for
Food Safety, the court found that the purported economic harm cited
by defendants did not warrant RWV.2 14 As previously discussed, agri-
cultural biotechnology defendants could change their argument to
show real environmental or human harm rather than purely adverse
economic consequences. 21 5 Still, the risk of environmental disruption
207 See HILLSON, supra note 147, at 1-38.
208 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754, 2756 (2010); Ctr.
for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
209 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
211 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Cr. for Food Safety, 734 F.
Supp. 2d at 952-53.
212 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
213 Cr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 952-55.
214 See id. at 952-55.
215 See supra Part III.C.
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for the non-GM-seed farmers would likely outweigh the potential
harm to seed manufacturers awaiting completion of the EIS.2 16 Farm-
ers would likely not have to destroy GM seed already in the ground.
But non-GM farmers face ongoing risk of crop contamination if plant-
ing continues during the pendency of the EIS. This risk of disruption,
due precisely to the risks the agency would be studying in the EIS,
merits vacating the defective deregulatory decision.
Answering the RWV question correctly in the lower courts is espe-
cially important since the issue of RWV's legality is unlikely to reach
the Supreme Court. Only the precise set of circumstances would cre-
ate such an opportunity. The defendant in an RWV case has little
incentive to apply for writ of certiorari to the Court since avoiding
vacation will likely satisfy the party. The winning party would also be
unlikely to expend further time and money on such a legal question
in a case in which the party was already victorious on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The agricultural biotechnology industry affects a number of ad-
ministrative agencies, scores of regulated industries, and millions of
regulatory beneficiaries-farmers and consumers alike. As the USDA
grapples with the exponential growth of complex GMOs, courts will
undoubtedly continue to find themselves in the center of a deregu-
latory battle. Courts have their hands full simply determining whether
deregulation is defective. But courts must consider (and litigants
must appreciate) the likely consequences on remand of the remedy
ultimately imposed.
Arguments for and against RWV support excluding this remedial
device from environmental deregulatory cases. Once a court finds the
deregulation invalid, it should vacate. Even if courts apply the two-
part RWV test to flawed environmental deregulation, the result should
be vacation-the benefits of vacation far outweigh the costs.
Presently, the subset of environmental deregulation making its
way to the judiciary is agricultural biotechnology. But such deregula-
tion occurs in other areas as well. Courts have the ability to set wise
precedent in these cases by following the APA's mandate and vacating
defective deregulation.
216 See Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 952-55. Although courts speak of balanc-
ing interests and although the possible harm may not merit injunctive relief, vacation is
still the presumptive remedy under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006); see also Sierra
Club v. Van Antwerp, 719 F. Supp. 2d 77, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) ("While the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear in Monsanto that there is no presumption to other injunctive relief, both
the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit Court have held that remand, along with vacatur,
is the presumptively appropriate remedy for a violation of the APA." (citation omitted)).
Balancing in this context simply determines whether to use the legally questionable RWV
tool.
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